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Abstract
We consider a model of international migration with heterogeneity in the skill
level of workers which accounts for country-specic educational investment, unem-
ployment expectations and return to the origin country. We prove that migrants
invest less than natives in human capital formation because of return migration, so
that migrants are more likely to be unemployed and to have atter earnings proles.
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1 Introduction
Numerous empirical studies have attempted to identify the eect of immigration on the
labor market outcome (see Abowd and Freeman, 1991, Borjas et alii, 1997, Gang and
Rivera-Batiz, 1994). In the context of multifactor production functions in which migrants
and natives are separately incorporated, the impact of immigration on labor market is
shown to depend on the composition of skills between migrants and natives. Immigration
is expected to have an adverse eect on low-skilled natives when migrants are less skilled
than natives, so that the income distribution changes in favor of high skill labor. From
an empirical viewpoint, there are no large negative eects of immigration on both wages
and employment of the native population (Borjas, 1994, Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).
Immigrants' economic performance is often better than that of natives with similar
characteristics. During a long time, this fact has been explained by a self-selection of
migrants, who are presumably more educated and less risk averse than other segments
of the population of the origin country. However, the dierence in performance between
migrants and natives may also be linked to the structure of incentives faced by both
populations (Djaji¢, 1989). In particular, migrants have to be distinguished from natives
because there exists a positive probability of return migration in the origin country.
Galor and Stark (1990) examine the link between return decision and optimal decisions
of savings, and prove that migrants are expected to save more than natives. Thus, if return
migration does not take place, migrants are expected to outperform comparable natives.
Models of migration incorporating possible return behavior can be extended in several
directions, for example with interesting predictions concerning assimilation or dierences
of wages between origin countries (Schaeer, 1995)
1
. In Galor and Stark (1991), the
possibility of return to the home country leads to an intertemporal substitution in the
labor supply. Again, migrants are expected to be more performant than natives since
they exert a higher level of work eort (greater eort translates into higher incomes).
Previous models dealing with dierentiated incentives between migrants and natives
have neglected country-specic educational investment. Unfortunately, several studies
have shown that immigrants usually choose to invest in host-country human capital for-
mation, which improves their wage prole (Chiswick and Miller, 1994, Khan, 1997). So,
the purpose of our analysis is to account for human capital formation in a simple model
of international migration. Drawing on the model of Galor and Stark (1990, 1991) where
migrant's performance in terms of income is more likely to outweigh native's performance
when a high probability of return to the origin country is considered, we account for
heterogeneity in educational investment. This allows us to oer a human capital expla-
1
Schaeer (1995) notes that immigrants have a higher incentive to maintain strong ties to the ori-
gin country when the probability of return is high. Hence, assimilation is more dicult to achieve if
immigrants have an uncertain status in the receipt country.
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nation of migrants-natives dierences in labor market outcomes, which depend on future
earnings, expectations with respect to unemployment and country-specic human capital
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a two-
period model of migration which accounts for cross-country specic educational invest-
ment, unemployment expectations, and decision of return migration. The optimal level
of investment in human capital is characterized in section 3, and we respectively examine
the impact of exogenous and endogenous employment. Section 4 concludes.
2 A migration model with heterogeneous skill
Let us consider an international migration model with two types of agents, migrants and
natives. We assume that migrants come from a poor country and natives live in a rich
country, so that job opportunities are more attractive in the host country. We extend
the framework of Galor and Stark (1990, 1991) by assuming that immigrants may have
dierent levels of human capital.
Agents operate in a two-period setting. Each individual is characterized by a utility
function U , dened over the rst and second-period private consumptions denoted by
C
1
and C
2
. We rely on an additively separable utility function U(C
1
; C
2
) such that
U(C
1
; C
2
) = u(C
1
) + Æu(C
2
), with Æ the future discount factor. We assume that U is
continuous, twice dierentiable and and strictly concave (u
0
> 0, u
00
< 0)
2
.
In period 1, individuals oer one unit of labor inelastically. Let W
1
be the level of
income for that period, which is devoted to the rst-period consumption C
1
and human
capital formation. Let H be the personal amount of educational investment. Human
capital formation is costly for migrants, and we denote by f(H) the associated convex
cost function (f
0
(H) > 0 and f
00
(H) > 0. Thus, the rst-period budget constraint is
C
1
= W
1
  f(H). The occupational status for migrants is uncertain in period 2, so
that the second-period consumption is a random variable denoted by
~
C
2
. Specically, it
depends on the employment status in the labor market and on the probability of return to
the home country, since migrants are concerned by a strictly positive probability of return
to the origin country in period 2
3
. For the notation, let  be the exogenous probability
of return migration to the origin country.
2
We dier from Galor and Stark (1991) and Schaeer (1995) in that the level of satisfaction is just
dened over consumption choices. Leisure decisions do not matter in our framework.
3
Our analysis does not focus on the motives for return migration, which may be due to i) country
specic preferences, migrants having a preference for living and consuming in the home country, ii) price
dierentials, since migration return allows to take advantage of low price levels at home, iii) human
capital investments, migrants improving their earnings position at home later by being currently in the
foreign country, and iv) informational asymmetry, low-skilled migrants returning to the origin country
after true skill is revealed in the rich country.
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With probability 1   , the migrant stays in the host country in period 2. There
are two possibilities. First, the migrant has a paid job. By securing employment, theere
are two components for the migrant's income. It is dened as the sum of a xed wage
W
2
and returns of human capital. Benets of educational investment are given by the
functiong(H), characterized by decreasing returns (g
0
(H) > 0, g
00
(H) < 0). Second, the
migrant is in period 2 and he receives an unemployment compensation B. We consider a
xed individual benet since human capital investment is made only in period 1. Never-
theless, having more education decreases the probability of being unemployed in period 2.
We denote by p(H) the probability of being unemployed, with p
0
(H) < 0 and p
00
(H) < 0.
Now, with probability , the migrant returns to his origin country. Under return
migration, we suppose that the migrant nds a job with certainty in the origin country
(for instance by taking part in family productive activities. But job opportunities are
not so attractive, and the migrant receives a lower wage in the origin country denoted by
W
2
, with 0 <  < 1. The parameter  is a measure of the wage dierential between
the origin country and the host country. Given the probabilities of return migration
 and unemployment p(H), we get the following expression for the migrant's random
consumption in period 2 :
~
C
2
=
8
>
<
>
:
W
2
+ g(H) with probability (1  )(1  p(H))
B with probability (1  )p(H)
W
2
with probability 
(1)
We can now determine the optimal investment decision of the migrant. For simplicity,
let us consider that income are xed over time, i.e. W = W
1
=W
2
. The migrant seeks to
choose the level of human capital that maximizes his expected utility function U(C
1
;
~
C
2
).
The maximization program is given by:
max
H0
u(W   f(H)) + Æ [(1  )(1  p(H))u(W + g(H)) + (1  )p(H)u(B) + u(W )]
We easily deduce the optimal choice of educational investment H

:
f
0
(H

)u
0
(W   f(H

)) =
Æ(1  ) [p
0
(H

)(u(B)  u(W + g(H

))) + (1  p(H

))g
0
(H

)u
0
(W + g(H

))]
(2)
At the equilibrium, the marginal cost of human capital formation is equal to its marginal
benet given the probabilities of unemployment and return migration. We now derive the
impact of return behavior and unemployment expectations on the educational decision.
3 Human capital and exogenous unemployment
Suppose that the probability to be unemployed does not depend on human capital accu-
mulated by the migrant. This case is more likely when one considers a specic segment
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of the labor market, for example when both migrants and natives participate in low-skill
activities. Then, we have p(H) = p. From (4) and since p
0
(H) = 0, we get :
f
0
(H

)u
0
(W   f(H

)) = Æ(1  )(1  p)g
0
(H

)u
0
(W + g(H

)) (3)
meaning that the marginal benet is given by the positive returns of human capital
formation, which occurs when a migrant does not return and exerts a job in the host
country.
Proposition 1 The migrant's optimal investment in human capital decreases with the
unemployment probability and the probability of return migration.
Proof. From (5) such that EU
H

= 0 and using the implicit function theorem, we have
@H

=@p =  EU
H

p
=EU
H

H

and @H

=@ =  EU
H


=EU
H

H

. Given the concavity of u,
we get sgn dH

=dp = sgnEU
H

p
and sgn dH

=d = sgnEU
H


, so that we nally obtain :
sgn
@H

@p
= sgn   Æ(1  )g
0
(H

)u
0
(W + g(H

))
sgn
@H

@
= sgn   Æ(1  p)g
0
(H

)u
0
(W + g(H

))
Since we have g
0
> 0, u
0
> 0, 0 < Æ < 1 and 0 < p < 1, we deduce that @H

=@p < 0 and
@H

=@ < 0. QED
Dierences between migrants and natives are not related to traits distinguishing the
two populations, but to specic migrant's incentives given the uncertainty to remain in
the host country in period 2.
Corollary 1 Migrants are less qualied than natives.
Corollary 2 If migrants do not return to their origin country, their wages will be lower
than that of natives.
This model points out the role of migrant's incentives in explaining the relative mi-
grant's outcome. A migrant from a low-income country is less likely to invest in human
capital formation given the possibility of return decision, which implies a lower expected
wage. So, if migrants do not return, their wages will be lower than that of natives. That
less-permanent migrants are expected to achieve lower outcomes stands in contrast with
the conclusion obtained in Galor and Stark (1991, corollary 1), where labor supply eects
result in greater migrant's wage in the event that return migration does not materialize.
The dierence is not due to labor supply eects, but because of incentives to invest in
skills specic to the host country. Since migrants undertake less educational investment,
their labor market outcomes are lower than that of natives when return migration does
not materialize.
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4 Human capital and endogenous unemployment
We now consider that unemployment is endogenously determined, since decisions of hu-
man capital investment are expected to inuence the probability to nd a job in the labor
market. The probability of unemployment is supposed to be a decreasing, weakly convex
function of the level of human capital.
Proposition 2 With endogenous unemployment, the migrant's optimal investment in
human capital decreases with the return probability to the origin country.
Proof. Using the implicit function theorem, we get sgn @H

=@ = sgnEU
H


, so that :
sgn
@H

@
= sgn   Æ [p
0
(H

)(u(B)  u(W + g(H

))) + (1  p(H

))g
0
(H

)u
0
(W + g(H

))]
Since 0 < Æ < 1, 0 <  < 1, u(W + g(H

)) > u(B), p
0
(:) < 0 and g
0
(:) > 0, we arrive at
the result that @H

=@ < 0. QED
Again, we nd that migrants are expected to achieve lower outcomes than natives
when return migration does not occur, since the former face less incentives to invest in
human capital formation. So, given the possibility of country-specic education, migrants
are more likely to have atter earnings proles.
Corollary 3 Migrants display a higher rate of unemployment than natives.
This migration model which accounts for skill heterogeneity explains why migrants are
more likely to be unemployed in the host country. Since they do not invest enough in
human capital formation during the rst period given the possibility of return, it is more
dicult for them to secure employment in the second period when they do not return to
the origin country.
5 Concluding comments
In this paper, we have analyzed predictions of a two-period model of migration with
return behavior and skill heterogeneity. We show that less-permanent migrants have less
incentives to invest in host-country specic human capital. The theoretical predictions are
dierent from those obtained in a migration model with skill homogeneity (see Galor and
Stark, 1990, 1991). A migrant who expects to return to the origin country devotes less
resources to human capital formation, thereby leading to a lower second-period wage when
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the return migration does not materialize. With endogenous unemployment, migrants
have atter earnings proles and display higher rates of unemployment.
This impact of skill heterogeneity has to be linked with decisions towards post-migration
educational investment (Chiswick and Miller, 1994, Khan, 1997, Friedberg, 2000). On the
one hand, the prevalence of post-migration human capital formation in host countries is
the sign that the assumption of skill homogeneity is not correct in migration models with
return behavior. On the other hand, human capital investments are more likely among
immigrants groups that cannot easily or are unlikely to return home. For instance, Hansen
et alii (2001) show that refugee immigrants, characterized by a lower probability to return
to the home country, invest more in specic-country human capital. In our framework,
we prove that migrants facing higher expectations of return migration should invest less
in home-country education.
Knowing how immigrants invest in host-country specic skills is an important issue
from a public policy perspective, especially in the design of immigrants selection criteria.
Labor market outcomes for migrants in the host country depend on their origin-country
specic educational level. A country could be induced to select highly educated migrants,
who are more likely to perform well in the host country's labor market. But if migrants
are able to catch up through post-migration human capital formation, the divergence in
labor market outcomes for migrants and natives should be lessened. Hence, successful as-
similation of migrants in the host country strongly depends on post-migration investment
in human capital.
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